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Abstract: This article presents a comparative study of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), established by the U.S. Treasury during the 2008 financial
crisis, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a permanent bail-out fund
established by the European Union (EU) in 2012. The article begins by introducing the European Union and the Sovereign Debt Crisis briefly, and discusses
TARP and its impact on the United States economy. Then the article summarizes
the evolution of ESM along with the bail-out programs that have been provided
by ESM and its predecessors. The article then outlines the similarities and differencesbetween ESM and TARP, particularly in the accountability structures of
the two programs, and finally, analyzes the current situation in the European
Union and how the region could achieve sustainable stability.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
In October 2012, the European Union (“EU”) established a permanent
bailout fund called the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”).1 Its main
function is to provide liquidity to the Euro Area Member States through a
variety of financial instruments.2 Its objectives and functions are very similar to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) established by the U.S.
Treasury during the 2008 financial crisis.3 However, in retrospect, there is
much debate over whether the TARP was the right response.4 This paper
introduces the European Union and the Sovereign Debt Crisis briefly, discusses TARP and its impact on the United States economy, summarizes the
evolution of ESM along with the bailout programs that have been provided
by ESM and its predecessors, outlines the similarities and differences between ESM and TARP, particularly in the accountability structures of the
two programs, and finally, analyzes the current situation in the European
Union and how the region could achieve sustainable stability.
II.

EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT
CRISIS: A BACKGROUND
The European Union was an unprecedented attempt to establish intergovernmental peace and cooperation in a war-torn Europe after World War
II. What started out as the European Steel and Coal Community with six
members has evolved today into a powerful organization with twenty-eight
members.5 The evolution can be traced through certain key treaties: The
Treaty of Paris, the Treaties of Rome, the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty
of Nice, and most recently, the Treaty of Lisbon.6
The Treaties of Rome, signed in 1957, created the European Economic
Community (“EEC”).7 The EEC established a common market and free
trade between the six signatory member nations.8 A decade later, in 1967,
1 Matina Stevis, Key Facts About the ESM, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME BRUSSELS, (Sep. 12,
2012, 10:02AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2012/09/12/key-facts-about-the-esm.
2 Id.
3 Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, & Kermit Schoenholtz, Europe’s Banks

Need a TARP of Their Own, BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERGVIEW, (June 18, 2012,
6:30PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-06-18/savingeuro-starts-with-banks-cooley-richardson-schoenholtz.
4 Danielle Kurtzleben, The Case for and Against TARP, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (May 24, 2011, 4:41PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/05/
24/the-case-for-and-against-tarp.
5 The World Factbook: European Union, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html
(last updated Oct. 31, 2017).
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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the EEC was expanded to create the European Community (“EC”).9 The EC
established a single Commission, a Council of Ministers, and the European
Parliament.10 The EC continued growing in membership in the intervening
years, until in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty expanded it to include
wide-ranging intergovernmental cooperation in diverse fields such as foreign policy, defence, internal affairs, and economic and monetary policy.11
The economic and monetary policy cooperation created the European Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”), which is commonly referred to as the
Eurozone.12 The Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for the European Union and the Eurozone that we know today.
The Treaty of Nice tried to institute greater integration by establishing
a constitution for the EU.13 The proposal was rejected in the referenda held
in France and Netherlands.14 The effort was renewed in the Treaty of Lisbon, and was successful the second time around in achieving the original
vision of integration envisioned by the Treaty of Nice.15 The Treaty of Lisbon established the EU as the successor of the EC, replacing it and providing the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).16
The common currency, the euro, came into existence in 1999 and was
initially adopted by eleven member states.17 In the meantime, the EU continued growing, increasing its membership to the current size of twentyeight.18 Only nineteen states of the twenty-eight use the common currency.19
Id.
Id.
11 Maastricht Treaty, BBC NEWS: IN DEPTH: EURO GLOSSARY (Apr. 30, 2011,
11:51AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216944.stm.
12 Id.; Euro Area – EMU, OECD (Apr. 17, 2013), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/
detail.asp?ID=862.
13 See Bruno Waterfield, Lisbon Treaty Q & A: Your Guide to What It Means
and What Happens Next, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/majornews/6257617/Lisbon-Treaty-Q-and-A-your-guide-to-what-it-means
-and-what-happens-next.html.
14 Id.
15
See id.
16 Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Kristien Geeurickx and Jacques Buhart, The Lisbon
Treaty – brief overview of the key changes, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 4, 2009), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=48a4327a-c5e8-41a7-8000-c93e90ab
e763.
17
Edmund L. Andrews, Outlook 1999: International; With Euro, Europe Reinvents Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 04, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/04/
business/outlook-1999-international-with-euro-europe-reinvents-itself.html.
18 Will Martin, The Entire History of the Euro in One Chart, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jan. 03, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/knight-frank-chart-on-the-historyof-the-euro-2017-1.
19 Id.
9

10
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Title VIII of the TFEU lays the foundation of the economic and monetary union.20 While the treaty creates a strong monetary union and the union exercises authority over the monetary policies, economic and fiscal policy are left primarily to the discretion of the member states.21 Article 127 of
the TFEU establishes that the European Central Bank (“ECB”) would conduct the monetary policy of the union in conjunction with and supported by
the National Central Banks of the member states of the EMU.22 The ECB
and National Central Banks of the Eurozone member nations constitute the
European System of Central Banks (also referred to as the Eurosystem to
differentiate them from the system of banks supporting the twenty-eight
member EU).23
Article 125 of the TFEU calls for a “no bailout” policy for the European Union.24 In the face of this policy and the lack of fiscal integration between the member nations, the economic health of the union depends largely on member states exercising discipline over their individual fiscal
policies.25 Article 126 of the TFEU establishes guidelines on monitoring
and enforcing this fiscal discipline.26 Historically, the member nations of
the EU agreed on a pact to ensure fiscal discipline.27 This pact was called
the Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”) and was adopted in 1997.28 However, the SGP did not have clout over the member nations and was found to be
a weak form of control over national government spending in the member
nations of the EMU.29 Most members failed to strictly follow the rules set
forth by the SGP.30 In 2011, right in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis,
significant amendments were introduced to strengthen the SGP.31 These
were called the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.32 Most recently, these amendments were followed by the 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (commonly referred to
20 Vassilis Paliouras, Why Europe Should Say “No” to the Proposed Framework
of Economic Governance: A Legal and Policy Analysis in Light of the Establishment of the European Stability Mechanism and the Euro Plus Pact, 15 TOURO
INT’L L. REV. 39, 41 (2012).
21 Id. at 42.
22 René Smits, The Crisis Response in Europe ’s Economic and Monetary Union:
Overview of Legal Developments, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1135, 1139 (2015).
23 Id. at 1139.
24 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 125, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 99 [hereinafter TFEU].
25 See Smits, supra note 22, at 1140-41.
26 See TFEU art. 126, supra note 24.
27 See Smits, supra note 22, at 1141.
28 See id. at 1141-42.
29 Id. at 1142.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1144.
32 Id. at 1145-50.
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as the “Fiscal Compact” or TSCG).33
The Fiscal Compact is different from the earlier initiatives in that it
mandates that the member states implement national laws that require a balanced national budget, i.e., it requires an amendment to national constitutions (or the national equivalent to a constitution) requiring national governments to maintain a balanced budget.34 It also empowers member nations
to bring suits against another member that is violating this requirement in
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).35 Member nations have given up
significant control over their budgetary sovereignty under the Fiscal Compact.36
The divergence between how the monetary policy is exercised versus
how the economic and fiscal policy is exercised creates a disconnect that is
largely responsible for the crisis the European Union is currently facing.37
The loss of monetary policy to the ECB had unforeseen, and in retrospect,
catastrophic impact to the economies of certain member states.38 The ECB’s
policy was based on averages, trying to establish a policy that would work
“on average” for all economies that are a part of the EMU.39 However, this
view ignores the very real differences existing between the economies of
the member nations—Germany’s economy is fundamentally different from
that of Ireland’s, France’s from that of Greece’s.40 There was no one single
formula that fit all in this situation. This led to a monetary policy that created bubbles in economies like those of Spain and Ireland and encouraged irresponsible fiscal spending in economies such as Greece.41
Initially, during the boom between the years of 2003 to 2007, there
was not much attention paid to how ECB’s policy was impacting the fiscal
policies of member states.42 As mentioned above, states were not adhering
strictly to the requirements under the SGP. It was only after the credit crisis
of 2008, which led to a massive revaluation of assets and bursting of the real estate boom across the globe, that red flags were raised on the debt levels
of member nations of the EMU (beginning with Greece).43 Late in 2009, after Greece grossly violated the deficit to GDP ratio required by the TFEU
due to a revaluation of the deficit levels, Greece’s debt ratings were downId. at 1151.
Id.
35 Id. at 1152.
36 See id. at 1151-52.
37 See id. at 1143.
38
Id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 49,
54 (2012).
43 Id. at 56.
33
34
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graded.44 The downgrade saw widening spreads between the yields on the
sovereign bonds of Greece versus other countries in the EMU.45 There was
a domino effect where other countries with high debt to GDP ratios saw
widening yield spreads and credit rating downgrades: Ireland and Portugal
between late 2010 to early 2011, with Spain and Italy following in 2011.46
Although the sovereign debt crisis seems to be a very different animal
compared to the financial crisis in the United States that was precipitated by
the real estate crash, their effects have been strikingly similar in freezing the
credit markets and drying up liquidity.47 Before delving into the particulars
of ESM and its impact on the EU economy, it would be helpful to consider
how the United States responded to and contained the credit crisis. The next
section discusses the TARP set up in the United States to counter the impact
of the 2008 financial crisis.
III.
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
In March 2008, Bear Stearns collapsed and was subsequently bought
by J.P. Morgan Chase for a deeply discounted price of $10.00 per share.48
An emergency loan from the Federal Reserve of New York had been unsuccessful in saving the bank once the losses on securitized mortgage products started piling up rapidly.49 This was the beginning of a financial meltdown that almost completely froze capital markets in the United States and
to a large extent, internationally. The weekend that Lehman Brothers went
bankrupt also stands out as a key event in the financial panic of 2008.50
Merrill Lynch was also on the brink of a very similar fate before being acquired by Bank of America the very same weekend.51 A week before, on
September 7, 2008, the federal government had nationalized Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation after billions of dollars were written off by these organizations as bad
loans.52 The Federal Reserve and Treasury were stretched beyond their
means and were still unable to contain the panic in the financial markets.
After the Lehman collapse, the Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, approached Congress with a proposal to purchase $700 billion of securitized
Id.
Id.
46 Id. at 57.
47 See Nelson D. Schwartz, Financial Turmoil Evokes Comparison to 2008 Crisis, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A1.
48
Joshua Ruby, Sound and Fury, Confused Alarms, (Fn2) and Oversight: Congress, Delegation, and Effective Responses to Financial Crises, 47 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 209, 213 (2010).
49 Id. at 213.
50 See id. at 213.
51 Id.
52 Id.
44
45
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mortgage products that were behind the collapse of the markets.53 Although
the House of Representatives did not pass the initial draft of the bill, by October 3, 2008, an expanded bill with added legislation on areas such as tax
and energy was passed successfully and signed into law by President
George W. Bush as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”).54
The authority to purchase troubled assets as part of TARP under EESA was
set to expire on December 31, 2009.55 The key aims of EESA and TARP
were to ensure that families did not lose their homes, troubled assets were
removed from the balance sheets of financial institutions, and that the taxpayers’ interest were protected while achieving the first two aims.56
Congress delegated its TARP oversight responsibilities to four bodies
under the EESA: The Financial Stability Oversight Board (“FSOB”), the
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(“SIGTARP”), the Congressional Oversight Panel (“Panel”), and the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).57 Congress retained supervisory
oversight over these bodies.58 While FSOB and SIGTARP were executive
bodies, the latter two (Panel and GAO) were legislative bodies.59 The FSOB
was responsible for monitoring and reporting on the effectiveness of the
program and for recommending new or different courses of actions for the
Treasury.60 SIGTARP was responsible for monitoring TARP for fraud and
abuse.61 The Panel was tasked with producing monthly oversight reports on
whether the Treasury was successful in stabilizing the US economy. 62 The
Panel also had the power to hold hearings.63 GAO was the implementation
oversight arm of the legislative branchin its bimonthly reports it reviewed
the effectiveness of TARP and the acquisitions made by the program. 64 It
was also responsible for an annual audit of TARP.65
However, on October 28, 2008, soon after President Bush signed the
EESA under TARP, nine banks received liquidity injection from the Treas-

Id.
Breakdown of the Final Bailout Bill, WASH. POST (Sep. 28, 2008, 12:23 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/28/AR2008
092800900.html.
55 Id.
56 See Ruby, supra note 48.
57 Id. at 209.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 216.
60 Id. at 217.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 218.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
53
54
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ury through the Capital Purchase Program.66 As part of this program, the
Treasury purchased $250 billion worth of preferred equity in the nine participating banks.67 The participating banks were: Goldman Sachs Group
Inc., Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp.
(which had just agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch), Citigroup Inc., Wells
Fargo & Co., Bank of New York Mellon, and State Street Corp.68
The Capital Purchase Program was designed to function through a
voluntary election by the bank to apply for a credit line to their principle financial regulator.69 However, there was controversy surrounding the banks’
willingness to sell their preferred stock to the Treasury.70 The meeting of
the Chief Executive Officers of the nine banks with the Treasury Secretary,
Mr. Paulson, was fraught with tension and there were banks amongst the
nine that did not want to participate in the program at all.71 They felt that
their balance sheets were healthy and did not require a capital injection
from the government.72
The other key initiatives undertaken as part of TARP were: the Community Development Capital Initiative (“CDCI”), Capital Assistance Programs (“CAP”), American International Group (“AIG”) Investments, Targeted Investment Program (“TIP”), Asset Guarantee Program (“AGP”),
Automotive Industry Support Program (“AISP”), Credit Market Program
(“CMP”), Public Private Investment Program (“PPIP”), and TARP Housing
Programs.73
The CDCI invested capital, up to $570 million, into Community Development Financial Institutions.74 These institutions operate in markets
that are not served by mainstream financial institutions.75 The CAP was an
initiative to develop and implement exhaustive “stress tests” to help assess
the health of key bank holding companies in the United States.76 The stress
tests were helpful in restoring confidence in the financial markets and banks
66 Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/tarp-programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/
pages/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 31, 2015, 10:06AM).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Mark Lander & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2008, at A1.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72
Daniel G. Murray & William H. Quirk III, Capital Purchase Program Funds:
Thanks, But Maybe No Thanks, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Jun-Jul. 2009, at 42 (2009).
73 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 342-45 (2016).
74 Id. at 342.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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were able to raise capital from the private sector after the results of the successful tests were published.77
Under the AIG Investments plan, by December 31, 2008, the Treasury
had invested $40 billion into buying preferred shares of AIG. 78 The Treasury’s rationale was to mitigate systemic risks from a collapse of AIG. 79 AIG
underwent recapitalization and restructuring followed by an IPO in May
2011.80 After the IPO, the Treasury had a stake of 77% in the company,
down from 92% in January 2011.81 After several public offerings in the next
two years, the Treasury exited their position in the company fully.82
TARP’s investments into AIG totalled $67.8 billion, of which $55.3 billion
was recovered by the time the Treasury exited the program.83
TIP’s aim was to stabilize financial institutions that were considered
critical for the stability of the financial system.84 Under this program, the
Treasury invested $20 billion in preferred stock of Citigroup and another
$20 billion in preferred stock of Bank of America.85 By December 2009,
both banks had repaid the investments along with $3 billion in dividend
payments.86 The program cost the Treasury $40 billion and yielded $44.4
billion.87
AGP was established to guarantee assets held by financial institutions
considered to be critical to the financial system of the United States.88 Under this program, losses of up to $5 billion were guaranteed by the Treasury
on Citigroup’s $301 billion portfolio.89 A claim was never made and the
program yielded $3.9 billion in cash back for the federal government.90
AISP was established to prevent the collapse of the automotive industry in December 2008.91 TARP provided emergency loans to Chrysler,
Chrysler Financial, and GM under this program.92 TARP also invested in
the financial arm of GM called GMAC (later Ally Financial) and helped

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
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Chrysler and GM with their bankruptcy proceedings.93 Under this program,
TARP invested a total of $79.7 billion and received $70.5 billion in cash
back.94 CAP provided lending for consumers and small businesses through
loan facilities and programs.95
PPIP was established to help financial institutions remove mortgage
backed securities from their balance sheets.96 Under this program, publicprivate investment funds were set up to buy securities from financial institutions (since the private market for these securities had dried up).97 By November 30, 2015, this program involved an investment of $18.6 billion and
yielded $22.5 billion.98
TARP Housing Programs were aimed at ensuring that families did not
lose their homes to foreclosure.99 The programs provided financing for
mortgages to homeowners who were making a good faith effort to repay
their debts.100 The program also aimed to contain the spill-over effects of
foreclosures.101
As is evident by the breadth of programs undertaken as part of TARP
and the magnitude of taxpayer funds committed to it, it was an unprecedented effort to stabilize the economy. The next section considers the impact of the program and discusses whether TARP was successful in its mission.
IV.
IMPACT OF TARP ON THE US ECONOMY
There are divergent views on how TARP impacted the US Economy in
retrospect. While it has largely been credited as being instrumental in
stemming the wave of bankruptcies during the crisis and bringing stability
to a panicked financial markets,102 many critics have found TARP to have
been woefully lacking in addressing the needs of the wider population during a moment of immense financial turbulence.103
Id.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 345.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Declares Banks and Auto Bailouts Over, and
Profitable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2014, at B1.
103 See The Editorial Board, Editorial, The Real Bailout Victims, N.Y. T IMES,
Oct. 23, 2014, at A26; see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act: One Year
Later Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.
(2009) (testimony of Elizabeth Warren, Chairwoman, Congressional Oversight
Panel, Troubled Asset Relief Program).
93
94
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In its final report published in March 2011, the Congressional Oversight Panel (“COP”) critically analyzed the impact of TARP.104 The COP
found that the program was an extremely high-risk undertaking for the government, especially when using the taxpayers’ money to fund the program.105 If there had been another wave of bankruptcies or if the recovery
had not proceeded as planned, the program could have lost the federal government trillions.106 The program further fed into the financial markets perception of large banks being “too big to fail” and smaller banks not having
the same protection.107 This implicit assumption was built into the borrowing costs of these institutions in the financial markets, leading to higher
costs for smaller actors and discounted costs for the larger actors.108 This
further incentivized large banks to take federal protection for granted in the
future, creating moral hazard problems.109
Capital injection using TARP sent out a strong negative signal to the
financial markets about the health of the participating banks. Of the nine
banks that participated initially in the program, many were hesitant to accept the investment into their preferred equity stock because they expected
private investors to interpret it as a sign of weakness.110 In an environment
of financial panic and chaos, even a minute negative signal to the market
could potentially lead to substantive loss in stock value.111 The potential
participants also worried about greater regulatory scrutiny by the regulators
in the future if they decided to participate.112 A study on the impact of Capital Purchase Program on the stock performance of participating banks indicated that these banks underperformed the non-participating banks by 5.6%
during the period the program was initiated.113 However, after the initiation,
the valuation of the bank stocks adjusted upward such that they were outperforming the non-participating banks by 10.3 percent.114 The research
104 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL: MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE OVERSIGHT PANEL (2011).
105 Id. at 2.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See id.
110 See Murray & Quirk III, supra note 72, at 42.
111 Eric Dash & Jack Healy, New Plan, Old Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009,
at B1.
112 Id.
113 Jeffrey Ng, Florin Vasvari & Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, The Impact of
TARP’s Capital Purchase Program on the Stock Market Valuation of Participating
Banks, 14 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Chicago Booth School of Booth School of Business), http://faculty.chicagobooth.
edu/Regina.Wittenberg%20moerman/research/pdf/ImpactTARP ’sCapitalPurchaseP
rogram.pdf.
114 Id.
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found that banks with stronger fundamentals were more likely to participate
in the program, i.e. the banks that participated in CPP were generally more
profitable and had lower ratio of non-performing to total loans compared to
the non-participating banks.115 Given this, the devaluation in the stock was
likely due to negative investor sentiment existing in the market.116 This sentiment reversed post-initiation period of the CPP, the study suggests, as a
result of positive stress test results for the banks, early repayments by the
banks of the capital injections, and regular payments on the investment
made by TARP.117
Further, there were concerns over transparency and accountability of
the program.118 TARP was conceived originally for the purchase of troubled
assets; however, a majority of its initiatives went towards injecting capital
in the form of equity purchases.
When TARP purchased equity of banks under the CPP, there was no
way of determining whether the capital was used to divest the bad assets or
was diverted towards something else.119 There was widespread public anger
over the program that seemed to be handing taxpayer money to large banks
while it was ineffective in ensuring that people were not losing their
homes.120 The COP report found that TARP had failed in ensuring that the
tide of foreclosures was stemmed.121
Having considered the structure and impact of TARP in detail, we are
now in a position to pivot our attention towards European Stability Mechanism and its role in helping the EU manage the sovereign debt crisis. Fundamentally, ESM and TARP are both programs involving direct liquidity
injection into economies dealing with frozen credit markets. The next section lays out the structure of ESM and its impact in stabilizing the EU countries that were most severely impacted by the crisis.
V.

EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM: HISTORY AND
EVOLUTION
The objectives and functions of the ESM are very similar to those of
TARP. It is the most recent step in a long series of steps by the European
Union to contain a sovereign debt crisis that has raised existential doubts
for the union. Yield spreads widened considerably for the EU countries
burdened with rising sovereign debt, leading to them being locked out from
Id.
Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL: MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 104, at 3.
120 Id.
121 Id.
115
116
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the bond markets.122 The EMU member states agreed that intervention was
required to ensure that liquidity was available to the economic ecosystem of
these countries.123 This intervention took the form of direct financial aid,
leading to several temporary measures to help the affected nations, ranging
from loans from the International Monetary Fund124 to ad hoc bailout funds
such as the European Financial Stability Mechanism (“EFSM”)125 and the
European Financial Stability Fund (“EFSF”).126 Finally, and most recently,
the ESM was established as a permanent bailout fund for the region.127 So
far, five countries have received aid from these vehicles: Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus.128
The EFSM was established in early 2010, authorizing the EU Commission to raise money from financial institutions and to then lend that
money to the impacted nation.129 The EFSF was established outside of the
European Union, as a corporation under the jurisdiction of Luxembourg.130
The EMU member states were the shareholders of the corporation.131 To
raise capital for providing aid to struggling member nations, EFSF issued
bonds in the capital market insured by collateral posted by the shareholders
as paid in capital to the corporation.132 The EFSF, through its capacity to
raise capital as a corporation, had access to provide significantly higher
amount of aid compared to EFSM.133
The ESM is a permanent bailout fund, which was established in October 2012.134 Similar to EFSF, ESM was established out the European Union
by an ad hoc treaty, a treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.135 It replaces EFSF and is structured similarly as an intergovernmental organization established as a corporation under the laws of Luxembourg.136 TFEU was amended to include verbiage in Article 136 indicating
that the member states of EMU could establish a bailout fund to stabilize
See Lane, supra note 42, at 56-57.
Id.
124 See Hofmann, supra note 37, at 525.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 527.
127 Id. at 528.
128 Id. at 529.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132
Id.
133 Id. at 528.
134 Martina Stevis, Key Facts about the ESM, WALL ST. J.: REAL T IME BRUSSELS
(Sep. 12, 2012, 9:50 am), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2012/09/12/key-factsabout-the-esm.
135 See Hofmann, supra note 37, at 530.
136 Id.
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the euro if required.137
The Euro area member states are ESM’s shareholders and provide a total capital stock of €704.8 billion, divided according to a “contribution key”
amongst the member states.138 ESM has a board of governors, a board of
directors and a board of auditors.139 The Board of Governors is composed of
finance ministers of the member states of EMU.140 Each member state selects a governor on the board and the governor appoints a director and an
alternate director to the board of directors.141 The Board of Auditors is
composed of five members appointed by the Board of Governors.142 The
Managing Director of the ESM is appointed for a term of five years and is
the legal representative of the organization.143 Each of the three governance
bodies has specific functions described in the ESM bylaws, Rules of Procedures, and various ESM Guidelines.
ESM is capitalized through paid-in capital and committed callable capital of its shareholders.144 Currently, the paid-in capital equals €80.5 billion
and the committed callable capital equals €624.3 billion, leading to a total
capital of €704.8 billion.145 The lending capacity of ESM is a maximum of
€500 billion.146 ESM uses its subscribed capital to raise money in the capital
markets through the issuance of financial instruments to a variety of investors.147 It can provide aid to member states of EMU who have been shut out
of the bond markets through six key instruments: stability support loan,
primary and secondary market support facility, indirect recapitalization, direct recapitalization, and preventative credit lines.148
VI.

BAILOUTS FACILITATED THROUGH THE ESM AND ITS

Id.
Shareholders, ESM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/esm-governance#anc
_shareholders(last visited Feb. 06, 2017).
139 ESM Governance Structure, ESM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/esmgovernance#board_of_governors (last visited Feb. 06, 2017).
140 Board of Governors, ESM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/esm-governance#
board_of_directors (last visited Feb. 06, 2017).
141 Board of Directors, ESM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/esm-governance#
board_of_directors (last visited Feb. 06, 2017).
142 Board of Auditors, ESM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/esm-governance/boardauditors (last visited Feb. 06, 2017).
143 See ESM, supra note 140.
144 ESM Factsheet, ESM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2015-1216esmfactsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 02, 2018).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Alienor Anne Claire Duvillet-Margerit & Marcel Magnus, European Stability
Mechanism (ESM): Main Features, Oversight and Accountability, EUR.
PARLIAMENT 3-5 (Jan. 17, 2017).
137
138
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PREDECESSORS
This section delves deeper into the problems experienced by the economies of the five countries that have received aid from ESM, and its predecessors, and investigates the impact of these bailouts.
Greece
Greece was the first EMU member state to find itself on the brink of
default in 2009.149 In May 2009, the new post-election government in
Greece announced that the debt figures for that year had to be revised upwards from 6.0 to 12.7 percent.150 This large and unexpected revision was
followed by the Greek government’s retrospective adjustment of debt figures for the past several years.151 It was found that Greece had been reporting much lower figures for its debt to GDP ratio than what it should have
been.152 Further investigation revealed that Greece was able to do this
through buying derivatives from investment banks, such as interest rate
swaps, that had a long-term payout policy.153 Neither the derivatives, nor
the payouts were included in the debt calculations as they were not considered to be loans held by the government.154 Eurostat, the European Union’s
statistical office, published a report in January 2010 with allegations of
fraudulent data.155
Greece owed its creditors $300 billion and most of that debt was held
by banks, both domestic and international.156 This was a situation very similar to the “too big to fail” banks in the United States. It was thought that a
default would create panic in the financial markets, which would thus freeze
lending for a protracted amount of time.
In May 2010, The European Commission set up the Greek Loan Facility to provide bilateral loans of up to €80 billion over the period of May
2010 to June 2013.157 The final amount disbursed was much lower at €2.7
billion.158 This was in conjunction with €30 billion provided by the IMF
See Lane, supra note 42, at 56.
Id.
151 Id.
152 Louise Story, Landon Thomas Jr. & Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall St. Helped to
Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at A1.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155
Id.
156 See id.
157 Financial Assistance to Greece, E.U. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.
eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eufinancial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financialassistance-greece_en (last visited Feb. 05, 2017).
158 Id.
149
150
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under a standby arrangement.159 On March 14, 2012, a second bailout program was instituted for Greece.160 The undisbursed amount from GLF along
with an additional €130 billion was to be provided.161 This program was to
be financed primarily through EFSF, a predecessor of ESM.162 Until June
2015, a total of €164.5 billion were disbursed through this program—144.7
billion from the EFSF and 19.8 billion from the IMF.163 After the second
bailout program expired, the Greek government made a formal request for
further capital on July 8, 2015.164 This bailout was financed through the
ESM—the first disbursement of €13 billion was made on August 20, 2015
and an additional €10 billion was earmarked for bank recapitalization.165
The first disbursement was closely followed by the signature of an MoU between the EMU and Greece that contains wide-ranging fiscal policy conditionality.166
Ireland
Ireland’s economy entered a severe recession in 2008.167 Until 2007,
Ireland had been experiencing a boom in economy founded primarily on
rising housing prices and high labor productivity in its construction sector.168 The rise in construction and subsequent housing prices was driven by
Irish financial institutions offering mortgages at extremely low rates compared to the historical precedent.169 The growth in house completions can be
seen through the extraordinary numbers: total stock of houses stood at 1.2
million in 1991, rising to 1.4 million by 2000, and then rapidly increasing to
1.9 million by 2008.170 Similarly, house completions went from 19,000 in
1990 to 50,000 in 2000 and exploding to 93,000 in 2006.171 The boom in
the economy was fuelled single-handedly by the housing demand and the
construction industry.172
The gross overvaluation of the housing prices started correcting itself
Id.
Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167Karl Whelan, Ireland’s Economic Crisis: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
U.C. Dublin CTR. ECON. RES. 1, 8 (June 2013), http://www.karlwhelan.
com/Papers/Whelan-IrelandPaper-June2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).
168 Id. at 6.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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after the financial crisis in the United States triggered a worldwide slowdown.173 There was a halt in the construction activities, a fall in the demand
for houses and a consequent fall in housing prices.174 The collapse in the
construction industry led to high unemployment as this was the industry
that had singlehandedly created the booming economy and employed a
large number of people in the workforce.175 This was the beginning of a fiscal collapse for Ireland. With high unemployment, tax revenues collected
by the government fell sharply along with an increased outflow of social
welfare payments.176 A decline in real GDP with a magnitude of up to 10
percent combined with decrease in tax revenues and increased social welfare payments led to a sudden increase in the country’s debt to GDP ratio.177
The final straw for the Irish economy was a banking crisis that followed
bursting of the construction bubble and increasing sovereign debt.178 Irish
banks had large exposure to the real estate market through the mortgage
loans.179 With the real estate market declining, investors became increasingly hesitant to lend money to these banks, eventually freezing them out of
the bond markets.180 In September 2008, the Irish government provided a
blanket guarantee to the existing and future liabilities of domestic Irish
banks.181 However, this guarantee was not enough to stem the tide of negative investor sentiment and Irish banks continued to face difficulties in raising capital from the financial markets.182
By 2010, Irish banks were borrowing from ECB in much larger volumes than seen before.183 By November 2010, the Irish government had requested support from the EMU and an Economic Adjustment Program was
formally agreed by December.184 The bailout consisted of contributions
from the two predecessors of ESM (€22.5 billion from EFSM and €17.7 billion from EFSF), bilateral loans from the United Kingdom (€3.8 billion),
Sweden (€0.6 billion) and Denmark (€0.4 billion), and loans from the IMF
(€22.5 billion).185
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 10.
177 See id.
178 Id. at 11.
179 See id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 13.
182
Id.
183 Id.
184 Financial Assistance to Ireland, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economyeuro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eucountries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-ireland_en (last visited Feb.
02, 2017).
185 Id.
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Spain
The Spanish economy went through a very similar cycle of a real estate market bubble, construction boom, irresponsible bank lending practices, and the eventual bursting of the bubble as the Irish economy.186 Spanish
banks were typically considered a model for conservative lending among
the Western economies because they were required to maintain capital to a
much larger extent than comparable banks in other countries.187 However,
during the bubble in the real estate market, the capital requirements for
Spanish banks were relaxed, leading to a situation where banks were saddled with bad mortgages and were frozen out of the credit markets.188
Until 2012, the Spanish government tried multiple times to recapitalize
its banks.189 Unfortunately, these measures did not lead to lowering of borrowing costs.190 The rating agencies downgraded Spain’s ratings multiple
times in this period and its debt to GDP ratio reached unsustainable levels
for the country.191
In July 2012, EMU approved aid for Spain of up to €100 billion to be
disbursed through ESM.192 The program was designed to provide capital to
the banking sector of Spain.193 The Spanish government used about €41.3
billion (39.5 billion in December 2012 and 1.8 billion in February 2013).194
The ESM raised capital for the bailout by issuing debt securities in the form
of bills and floating rate notes.195 The bailout funds were provided to the
Spanish government’s bank recapitalization fund which then further disbursed it to the impacted banks.196 The bailout was accompanied with policy conditionality focused on Spanish banking sector reforms.197

186 Juan Carlos Hidalgo, Looking at Austerity in Spain, CATO INST.: CATO AT
LIBERTY BLOG (May 31, 2012, 1:39PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/lookingausterity-spain.
187 Jonathan Weil, The EU Smiled While Spain ’s Banks Cooked the Books,
BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 14, 2012, 6:30PM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-06-14/the-eu-smiled-while-spain-s-bankscooked-the-books.
188 See id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Financial Assistance to Spain, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economyeuro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eucountries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-spain_en (last visited Feb.
02, 2017).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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Portugal
Portugal requested aid from the EU, the EMU, and the IMF in April
2011.198 The Economic Adjustment Program was agreed upon by May 2011
and included €52 billion from EFSF and EFSM (€26 billion from each)
along with another €26 billion from the IMF.199 An MoU was signed between Portugal and the lending bodies to enact fiscal reforms in the country
to jumpstart the economy.200
Portugal’s woes were a result of market contagion from the troubles of
Greece and Ireland.201 Robert M. Fishman, writing in the opinion pages of
the New York Times, argued that Portugal had been driven into a crisis because of rating agencies and speculative traders who had driven up borrowing costs for the country.202 He argued that Portugal had strong fundamentals and would not have needed the bailout at all if it were not for market
distorting forces of actors such as rating agencies and speculators.203
Cyprus
The financial crisis in Cyprus was largely a result of the crisis in the
banking sector of the country. After the United States’ crisis in 2008, the
economy of Cyprus went into a recession.204 Growth kept declining in the
next few years, while unemployment kept rising, property values declined,
and the volume of nonperforming loans rose on the balance sheets of the
banks.205 The banking sector of Cyprus had large exposure to Greek debt
and with the crisis in Greece, their assets were devaluing rapidly.206 The assets took a haircut of 50% in 2011 in the midst of the Greek crisis.207 Between March and June of 2012, rating agencies downgraded Cyprus’ ratings
twice.208 Eventually, after being frozen out of the credit markets, the CypriFinancial Assistance to Portugal, https://ec.europa.eu/info/businesseconomy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financialassistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistanceportugal_en (last visited Feb. 02, 2017).
199 Id.
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201 Robert M. Fishman, Opinion, Portugal’s Unnecessary Bailout, N.Y. T IMES,
Apr. 13, 2011, at A25.
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204 See Jack Ewing, As Cyprus Recovers From Banking Crisis, Deep Scars Remain, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2015, at B1.
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207 Tim Worstall, There’s Something Very Strange About the Cyprus Bank Haircut. Very Strange Indeed, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2013, 11:10AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/03/31/theres-something-very-strange-about-thecyprus-bank-haircut-very-strange-indeed/#52113f4817d8.
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ot government requested a bailout from ESM on June 25, 2012.209
A bailout package of up to €10 billion was agreed by the EMU, with
ESM providing €9 billion and IMF providing the remaining €1 billion.210
Eventually, due to healthy economic recovery, bank recapitalization, and
access to private markets, Cyprus only needed to use 6.3 billion of the 9 billion provided by ESM.211
VII.
IMPACT OF THE ESM BAILOUTS
The impact of the ESM bailouts on the economies of the countries discussed in the section above raises similar issues as the ones discussed under
the impact of TARP on the US economy: social unrest, moral hazards, and
accountability issues. However, one key difference stands out in the context
of EMU—the impact of austerity measures on the economic, political, and
social climate of these countries.
The fiscal policy conditionality attached to the Economic Adjustment
Programs frequently includes austerity measures that bring about drastic reductions in public spending.212 Austerity economics is a dangerous, sliding
slope, especially when a country’s economy is in recession. When the GDP
is growing sluggishly, cutting back on public spending entrenches unemployment.213 With increasing unemployment, the population generally cuts
back consumption and saves more of their disposable income, further contracting the economy.214 In the midst of this phenomenon, the decrease in
social welfare payments as a result of austerity measures creates social
backlash within the country.
The catastrophic impact of austerity measures was very clearly seen
across almost all the participants in the bailout programs of the EMU. There
was a double-dip recession after the implementation of austerity measures:
in 2012 and 2013, respectively; the economy of Cyprus contracted 2.4 and
6 percent; the economy of Greece contracted 6.4 and 3.7 percent, the economy of Portugal economy contracted 3.2 and 1.6 percent; and the economy
of Spain contracted 1.6 and 1.2 percent.215 There were widespread protests
(May 31, 2011, 1:43AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43220821.
209 Cyprus, ESM, http://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/cyprus (last visited Feb.
02, 2017).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Paul Krugman, The Austerity Delusion, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austeritydelusion.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Michael D. Arena, The Legal Frameworks Governing Sovereign Debt and
Borrowing in the United States and European Union, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 283,
283 (2014).
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across these countries, calling for cessation of the austerity measures.216
Many of these protests were indicative of a rising wave of populism across
the politics of the European Union.217
These protests were closely related to the stigma attached to these
bailouts, with the general population feeling disenfranchised over the distribution of funds. There was a feeling of discontent that the funds received
went disproportionately into strengthening banks and their executives while
the middle class did not see any results.218
To mitigate the problem of moral hazard, the bailouts were initially
provided with punitive premiums of up to 300 basis points.219 However, not
only did these punitive interest rates create a situation where it was harder
for the struggling economies to make payments on the loans, they also led
to a perception that the rest of EMU and the IMF profited from the unfortunate situation in crisis-stricken countries.220 Eventually, the assistance from
EMU and related intergovernmental organizations (ESM, EFSF, EFSM)
were given without the punitive premiums.221
Finally, the billions that were handed out in aid have not trickled down
into the economy for these countries.222 The funds have been used to make
payments on international loans and sovereign bond payments to large
bank, who held the majority of the sovereign European debt.223 A lot of the
capital has also been diverted into bolstering the balance sheets of banks
teetering on the verge of bankruptcy.224 However, it is not clear how these
funds have been utilized beyond ensuring the credit markets that the banking sector of the European countries receiving aid are not recapitalized.
VIII. TARP AND ESM COMPARED
TARP and ESM arose from similar needs to bolster struggling economies in which traditional financial markets had failed to provide capital and
have similar goals. This section compares the two organizations in two key
facets: their accountability structures and their impact on the economy.
216 Eric Reguly, From Fringe to Spotlight: European Austerity Breeds Radical
Politics, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com
/report-on-business/international-business/out-of-the-fringe-and-into-the-spotlighteuropean-austerity-breeds-radical-politics/article21462957.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See Lane, supra note 42, at 56.
220
Id. at 57.
221 Id.
222 Liz Alderman et al., Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 17,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greecedebt-crisis-euro.html?_r=0
223 Id.
224 Id.
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Accountability Structures
As summarized in the earlier section on TARP, there were robust accountability structures around the program. In fact, due to pressures from
regular audits of the program, the Treasury had to modify its behavior and
strategies while implementing it.225 In comparison, ESM does not seem to
have the same amount of scrutiny on its actions.226 This section discusses
the accountability structures in place for ESM and argues that they are neither democratic in nature, nor are they enough to affect decision-making by
the Board of Governors and Board of Directors.
There are certain accountability tools that are entrenched in the structure of the EU Agencies.227 Some of these tools are consultation procedures,
transparency duties, access to information, and the obligations to report to
the European Parliament.228 Since ESM was established through intergovernmental treaty between the ESM members, it falls outside the purview of
the traditional European law and EU Institutions.229 Instead, it is governed
by international law.230 This structure of ESM drastically reduces the level
of oversight that the EU bodies, such as the European Parliament (“EP”),231
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),232 or the European Council of Auditors
(“ECA”),233 could exercise over it.
Three provisions in the ESM Treaty could be interpreted as establishing a sort of accountability structure.234 First, a public annual report containing an audited statement of its accounts along with providing the member
states with quarterly profit and loss statements.235 Second, ESM is required
to set up an internal audit function that is compatible with international
standards.236 This audit function is the ESM’s Board of Auditors.237 ESM is
also required to be audited by external auditors approved by the Board of
See supra note 116, at 11.
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM): No Democracy at the Bailout
Fund, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY: ECON. & FIN. (Jun. 5, 2014), https://
corporateeurope.org/economy-finance/2014/06/european-stability-mechanism-esmno-democracy-bailout-fund.
227 Gregory Terrace, The Difficult Trade-Off Between Economic Stability and
Democratic Accountability: The Case Study Of The European Stability Mechanism,
UNIV. GHENT 3 (2015), http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/214/780/RUG01002214780_2015_0001_AC.pdf.
228 Id.
229 See id. at 15.
230 Id. at 16.
231 See id. at 23.
232 See id. at 27.
233 See id. at 29.
234 See id. at 20-21.
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Governors.238 These external auditors have the full power to inspect ESM’s
accounts.239 Finally, ESM is obliged to make the annual report published by
the Board of Auditors available to national parliaments and audit institutions of the member states.240
These provisions leave a lot to be desired. While they establish procedures for transparency, they do not establish a dialogue between the various
EU institutions and ESM.241 The European Commission (“EC”) or the EP
cannot directly interrogate ESM on its actions.242 Furthermore, they do not
have the power to change ESM’s behavior through sanctions or hearings.243
ESM is not answerable to the European Court of Justice unless a member
state files a suit against it.244 There is broad legal immunity for the board of
governors and board of directors.245 Contrast this with the power Congress
wielded over the actions taken under TARP and the tangible ways in which
TARP was modified due to Congressional oversight and hearings.246
Impact on the Economy
As elaborated in the sections above on the impact of TARP and ESM
on the economy of the United States and the impact EMU countries respectively, both programs led to negative signals in the financial markets for the
participants, whether they were sovereigns or financial institutions.247 Both
programs also created incentives for market distorting behavior, such as
moral hazard.248
There are also similarities between the two programs in the amount of
control exercised by the lending party over the funds disbursed. ESM and
TARP did not exercise complete control over how the aid recipients used
the capital provided to them. One of the key criticisms discussed earlier in
the paper for TARP was the CPP, through which billions of dollars were
injected into the balance sheet of banks without any control over how those
Id.
Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 23.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Michael Schwarz, A Memorandum of Misunderstanding – The Doomed Road
of the European Stability Mechanism and a Possible Way Out: Enhanced Cooperation, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 389, 399-400 (2014).
245
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246 See supra note 104, at 3-4.
247 See Ross Douthat, Opinion, The Great Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2010, at A27. See also Daniela Schwarzer, The EU Debt Crises: Three Weaknesses of the European Stability Mechanism, TRIPLE CRISIS (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://triplecrisis.com/the-eu-debt-crises/.
248 Schwarzer, supra note 247.
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funds were used by the banks.249 Comparatively, ESM arguably exercises
greater control over the disbursed funds through the policy conditionalities
that are tied together with the funds in the signed MoUs. However, this control exercised by ESM might actually be counterproductive. Through the
policy conditionalities attached to the aid, participating EMU countries
were mandated to institute austerity measures.250 However, the oversight
over how financial institutions used the funds disbursed to them through
ESM was not this rigorous. Also, austerity measures prolonged the recession in several of the participating EMU nations.251
While TARP was based on a philosophy of quantitative easing, ESM
was structured with fiscal conservatism in mind. These divergent attitudes
are understandable given the fundamental difference between the United
States and any individual nation member of the EMU: while the United
States can control its fiscal and monetary policies, members of EMU only
control the fiscal policy. Without a closer alignment of the fiscal policies of
the EMU nations, ESM’s success will be limited. The economy of the EU is
still highly fragile and cannot be considered to have completely recovered.
It would be invaluable for the region to have greater fiscal integration.
The European Union has made strong progress towards better fiscal integration in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis through the establishment
of a banking union for the region.252 However, one of the key requirements
for a banking union, deposit insurance, is missing from the current implementation.253 There is strong opposition from some member states over an
EU-wide deposit insurance (nations with healthy economies are worried
over having to insure assets in unhealthy economies).254
However, it would be prudent for the EU to strengthen the union as
soon as possible because of recent developments in the region. First, Italy’s
banks seem to be heading towards a similar banking crisis as faced by those
in Spain and Cyprus.255 Second, while the economic situation remains tense
in the region, the political situation has also taken a turn for the worse.256
The United Kingdom voting to leave the EU (“Brexit”) has fanned nationalNEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET
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ist and populist movements throughout the EU.257 This will only worsen the
existing anti-EU sentiment that had arisen as a result of the widespread austerity measures.258 A well-functioning banking union that establishes fiscal
integration could be a uniting factor in this climate.259
IX.
CONCLUSION
EU and EMU have the difficult task of functioning as a well-integrated
federation of member states while maintaining the sovereignty of the members over important matters such as fiscal policy. Efforts to create a more
robust integration such as the banking union have exposed the internal divisions within the union further. Like TARP, ESM is a fire-fighting mechanism and to be successful it requires better accountability structures to ensure that funds are channelled into the right growth areas. In the long-run,
the EU cannot rely on capital injections to ensure financial stability in the
region. Greater fiscal integration would ensure that conditions that give rise
to crises like the one facing the EU today do not arise again in the future.
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